Supreme Court Protects Free Speech: Sets Aside Wikipedia Takedown Order in Defamation Case
In a landmark judgment that reinforces the fundamental right to free speech and expression in the digital age, the Supreme Court of India has set aside a Delhi High Court order that had directed Wikimedia Foundation to take down content discussing ongoing legal proceedings. The case of Wikimedia Foundation Inc. versus ANI Media Private Limited & Others represents a significant victory for free speech advocates and establishes important principles about the boundaries of judicial authority in regulating online discourse about court proceedings.
The legal battle began when ANI Media Private Limited filed a defamation suit against Wikimedia Foundation and others, alleging that false and misleading content was being published about the company on Wikipedia. What started as a routine defamation case quickly escalated into a major constitutional debate about free speech, judicial authority, and the right to discuss court proceedings in public forums.
The Supreme Court’s judgment, delivered by Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, contains powerful language about the importance of free expression and the role of courts in a democratic society. The Court emphasized that “courts, as a public and open institution, must always remain open to public observations, debates and criticisms. In fact, courts should welcome debates and constructive criticism.” This statement sets the tone for a judgment that carefully balances the need to protect judicial dignity with the fundamental right to free expression.
The Background of the Case
The dispute originated when ANI Media Private Limited filed a suit (CS(OS) No. 524/2024) against Wikimedia Foundation and others, seeking to restrain them from publishing allegedly false and defamatory content about the company on Wikipedia. On August 20, 2024, a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court directed Wikimedia Foundation to disclose the subscriber details of certain administrators who were allegedly involved in publishing the contentious content.
What triggered the constitutional crisis was the publication of an opinion piece in the Indian Express and a video by news agency Medianama that discussed the case and criticized the High Court’s approach. These pieces argued that the court’s decision to compel disclosure of editors’ private information could challenge freedom of speech and information, potentially setting a wrong precedent that could be used to censor critical information.
When Wikimedia Foundation appealed the Single Judge’s order before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, the respondent complained about the publication of these critical pieces. The Division Bench, in its order dated October 16, 2024, took strong exception to the content, stating that “this Court is of the prima facie view that the aforesaid comment on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge amounts to interference in Court proceedings, and that too, on a website managed by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. who is a defendant in the suit. The subjudice principle, prima facie, seems to have been ‘violated with impunity’ by Wikimedia Foundation Inc.”
The High Court directed Wikimedia Foundation to “take down/delete the said pages and discussion with regard to the observations made by this Court within thirty six (36) hours,” characterizing the content as potentially bordering on contempt.
Wikimedia Foundation’s Arguments
Before the Supreme Court, senior counsel for Wikimedia Foundation presented several compelling arguments challenging the High Court’s takedown order. He submitted that “the Division Bench is palpably in error in holding that a prima facie case of interference in court proceeding, violation of the subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and bordering on contempt was made out.”
The counsel emphasized Wikimedia’s role as an intermediary, arguing that “High Court failed to consider that appellant is merely an intermediary having the limited role of providing technical infrastructure to host the platform and does not edit, update, maintain or monitor the contents on the platform.” This distinction was crucial, as it highlighted that Wikimedia, as a platform, could not be held responsible for user-generated content in the same way as a publisher.
On the subjudice principle, the counsel relied on the Constitution Bench decision in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India, which established that for violation of the subjudice principle to be found, there must be “a real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to the proper administration of justice” and that “reasonable alternative methods will not prevent the risk to fairness of the trial.”
The counsel argued that “there is no discussion at all by the Division Bench as to how the pages hosted on the platform of the appellant constitute a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the pending proceedings before the learned Single Judge. The impugned order is devoid of any reason.”
Perhaps most significantly, the counsel contended that “the direction to take down the said pages is an unreasoned, unwarranted one and in violation of the right to open justice guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Further, it impinges upon the freedom of speech and expression, a guaranteed right under Article 19(1)(a).”
The counsel warned that “passing of orders like the impugned one would have a chilling effect not only on free speech but also on the right to know. It would impinge upon the right to freely access and use the medium of internet.”
ANI Media’s Defense
In response, the counsel for ANI Media Private Limited argued that the Supreme Court should not interfere with the High Court’s order, characterizing it as “only in the nature of an interim order.” He emphasized that “appeal is pending as well as the suit. Therefore, this Court should not entertain the appeal.”
The respondent’s counsel defended the takedown order by arguing that “such airing of adverse comments, that too on the platform of a party to the suit, certainly amounts to interference in court proceedings.” He maintained that “the Division Bench was justified in directing the appellant to take down/delete the offending pages. No interference is called for.”
The Supreme Court’s Elaborate Analysis
The Supreme Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the legal principles governing free speech, contempt of court, and the subjudice principle. The Court began by examining the specific content that had prompted the High Court’s order, noting that it contained “details regarding the defamation case filed by respondent No. 1 against the appellant and some comments allegedly made by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in the case.”
The Court then embarked on a detailed examination of precedent, starting with Reliance Petrochemicals Limited Vs. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers, where the Court had held that “preventive injunction against the press can be granted only if reasonable grounds for keeping the administration of justice unimpaired necessitate so.” The Court had accepted “the test of present and imminent danger on the basis of balance of convenience” and clarified that injunction would be justified only “if the danger apprehended is real and imminent.”
The Court particularly emphasized the right to know, noting that in Reliance Petrochemicals, it had recognized that “people at large have a right to know in order to be able to take part in a participatory development in the industrial life and democracy. Right to know is a basic right which citizens of a free country like ours aspire in the broader horizon of the right to live in this age under Article 21 of our Constitution.”
The Court’s analysis of the Constitution Bench decision in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited was particularly significant. The Court noted that in Sahara, it had examined “the interplay between the constitutional safeguard of free speech on the one hand and the doctrine of prior restraint on the other hand.” The Constitution Bench had observed that “freedom of the press which is a facet of freedom of expression includes the right to receive information and ideas of all kinds from different sources. In essence, freedom of expression embodies the right to know.”
The Court highlighted the Sahara decision’s holding that “a postponement order is actually a balancing measure. It seeks to balance the right to free speech as well as the right to information on the one hand and the presumption of innocence of the accused on the other hand.” However, the Constitution Bench had cautioned that “given that postponement orders curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, such orders have to be passed only in cases in which there is real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to the proper administration of justice.”
The Court also referenced the important decision in Suvapnil Tripathi Vs. Supreme Court of India, which emphasized that “our legal system subscribes to the principle of open justice” and that “right to access justice flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution would be meaningful only if the public gets access to the proceedings unfolding before the courts.”
In a powerful passage, the Court quoted Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud’s concurring opinion in Suvapnil Tripathi, which referenced Lord Diplock’s observation that “open courts are a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy. Open courts, in his view, help build public confidence in the administration of justice.” Justice Chandrachud had also referenced Jeremy Bentham’s view that “publicity about courtroom proceedings is a mechanism to prevent improbity of Judges: it is the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the Judge himself, while trying, under trial.”
The Court placed particular emphasis on its recent decision in Imran Pratapgadhi Vs. State of Gujarat, where it had highlighted “the importance of freedom of expression and the duty of the courts to uphold such freedom.” The Court in that case had observed that “sometimes Judges may not like spoken or written words but still it is the duty of the courts to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). Except the courts there is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens.”
The Imran Pratapgadhi decision contained particularly strong language: “Courts, particularly the constitutional Courts, must be at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. It is the bounden duty of the Courts to ensure that the Constitution and the ideals of the Constitution are not trampled upon. Endeavour of the courts should always be to protect and promote the fundamental rights, including the freedom of speech and expression, which is one of the most cherished rights a citizen can have in a liberal constitutional democracy. The Courts must not be seen to regulate or stifle the freedom of speech and expression.”
The Court’s Analysis of Contempt Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court conducted an extensive review of contempt jurisprudence, particularly focusing on the classic case of In Re S. Mulgaokar. The Court noted that Chief Justice Beg, speaking for the Bench, had said that “if criticism of court proceedings or court orders is done in a reasonable manner, which pre-supposes accuracy of information about a matter on which any criticism is offered, and arguments are directed fairly against any reasoning adopted, I would, speaking for myself, be the last person to consider it objectionable even if some criticism offered is erroneous.”
The Court particularly emphasized Justice Krishna Iyer’s concurring opinion in Mulgaokar, where he culled out several principles. The first principle was that “the court will act with seriousness and severity where justice is jeopardised by a gross and/or unfounded attack on the Judges, where the attack is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process. The court is willing to ignore, by a majestic liberalism, trifling and venial offences — the dogs may bark, the caravan will pass.”
The second principle identified by Justice Iyer was “to harmonise the constitutional values of free criticism, the Fourth Estate included, and the need for a fearless curial process and its presiding functionary, the Judge. A happy balance has to be struck, the benefit of the doubt being given generously against the Judge.”
Justice Iyer had also emphasized that “to criticise the Judge fairly, albeit fiercely, is no crime but a necessary right, twice blessed in a democracy For, it blesseth him that gives and him that takes. Where freedom of expression, fairly exercised, subserves public interest in reasonable measure, public justice cannot gag it or manacle it, constitutionally speaking.”
The Court also referenced Lord Denning’s approach in Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex. p. Blackburn, where he had stated: “We will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself.”
The Court’s Final Ruling and Reasoning
After this comprehensive analysis, the Supreme Court arrived at its conclusion. The Court powerfully stated that “courts, as a public and open institution, must always remain open to public observations, debates and criticisms. In fact, courts should welcome debates and constructive criticism. Every important issue needs to be vigorously debated by the people and the press, even if the issue of debate is subjudice before a court.”
The Court acknowledged that when publications scandalize the court or judges, and if a case of contempt is made out, courts should take action. However, the Court made a crucial distinction: “But it is not the duty of the court to tell the media: delete this, take that down.”
The Court emphasized the importance of introspection for judicial improvement, noting that “for the improvement of any system and that includes the judiciary, introspection is the key. That can happen only if there is a robust debate even on issues which are before the court.”
The Court recognized that “both the judiciary and the media are the foundational pillars of democracy which is a basic feature of our Constitution. For a liberal democracy to thrive, both must supplement each other.”
While the Court noted Wikimedia’s argument that it was an intermediary under the Information Technology Act and therefore not liable for third-party content, the Court explicitly stated that “we are not inclined to examine this aspect of the matter since it may have a bearing on the proceedings of the pending suit.” However, the Court firmly concluded that “the Division Bench had reacted disproportionately while issuing the impugned directions.”
Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s takedown order, allowing Wikimedia Foundation’s appeal. This judgment represents a significant reaffirmation of free speech principles in the digital age and establishes important boundaries for judicial authority in regulating public discussion of court proceedings.
Petitioner Name: Wikimedia Foundation Inc..Respondent Name: ANI Media Private Limited & Others.Judgment By: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan.Place Of Incident: Delhi.Judgment Date: 09-05-2025.Result: allowed.
Don’t miss out on the full details! Download the complete judgment in PDF format below and gain valuable insights instantly!
Download Judgment: wikimedia-foundation-vs-ani-media-private-li-supreme-court-of-india-judgment-dated-09-05-2025.pdf
Directly Download Judgment: Directly download this Judgment
See all petitions in Fundamental Rights
See all petitions in Constitution Interpretation
See all petitions in Public Interest Litigation
See all petitions in Judgment by Abhay S. Oka
See all petitions in Judgment by Ujjal Bhuyan
See all petitions in allowed
See all petitions in Quashed
See all petitions in supreme court of India judgments May 2025
See all petitions in 2025 judgments
See all posts in Constitutional Cases Category
See all allowed petitions in Constitutional Cases Category
See all Dismissed petitions in Constitutional Cases Category
See all partially allowed petitions in Constitutional Cases Category
