Supreme Court Rules High Courts Can Quash Domestic Violence Proceedings Under Limited Circumstances

In a landmark judgment that clarifies the legal landscape surrounding domestic violence cases in India, the Supreme Court has delivered a crucial verdict addressing whether High Courts can exercise their inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings initiated under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The case involved Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi and other family members challenging proceedings initiated by Vidhi Rawal, who had filed an application under Section 12 of the DV Act alleging domestic violence and dowry demands.

The dispute originated from a marriage between Prateek Tripathi and Vidhi Rawal in December 2019. According to the respondent’s claims, after two years of marriage, she faced demands for dowry amounting to Rs. 20 lakh cash and a top model SUV car. She alleged mental and physical harassment when she returned from her work in Johannesburg, South Africa. The respondent first lodged an FIR in January 2022 under various sections of the IPC and subsequently filed an application under Section 12 of the DV Act in March 2022 before the District and Sessions Judge, Dewas, Madhya Pradesh.

The appellants, comprising the husband, brother-in-law, and parents-in-law, filed petitions under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking to quash the DV Act proceedings. The High Court dismissed their petitions, holding that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act, being of a civil nature, cannot be quashed. This led to the appeals before the Supreme Court, raising fundamental questions about the nature of DV Act proceedings and the scope of High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

The appellants, represented by senior counsel, made several key arguments. They contended that “the learned Magistrate has been conferred jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act, 2005. The term Magistrate is defined under Section 2(i) of the DV Act, 2005 to mean a Judicial Magistrate of first class or, as the case may be, a Metropolitan Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the CrPC. Therefore, the Court of a Judicial or Metropolitan Magistrate is a Criminal Court constituted under the provisions of the CrPC.”

They further argued that “although remedies under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 can be availed of in a Civil Court or Family Court as per Section 26, Section 26 cannot be read to understand the scheme of the DV Act, 2005.” The appellants relied on decisions from the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts which had held that applications under Section 482 CrPC are maintainable against orders passed under the DV Act to prevent abuse of the process of Court and to secure the ends of justice.

The respondent’s counsel presented counter-arguments, asserting that “proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, cannot be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC.” He contended that “the High Court rightly held that the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, are civil in nature.” The respondent relied on the objects and reasons of the DV Act to submit that the Legislature intended the proceedings thereunder to be civil in nature.

The respondent’s counsel further argued that “an application under section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, is not a ‘complaint’ under section 2(d) of the CrPC. Further, he argued that Sections 200 to 204 of the CrPC do not apply to proceedings under the DV Act, 2005 and a Magistrate cannot treat an application under the DV Act, 2005 as a complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC. The notice issued to the respondent on an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 is not a summons under Section 61 of the CrPC but is a notice set out in Form VII of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006.”

COURT’S ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT

The Supreme Court, in its detailed analysis, began by examining the scheme and object of the DV Act, 2005. The Court noted that “the DV Act, 2005 was enacted with the object of providing more effective protection to the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are the victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. The DV Act, 2005, has been enacted to tackle the menace of domestic violence faced by women in our society.”

The Court extensively discussed the definition of domestic violence under Section 3, which includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, and economic abuse. The definition is comprehensive and covers various forms of harm and coercion. The Court also examined the definition of ‘domestic relationship’ under Section 2(f) and ‘aggrieved person’ under Section 2(a), noting the wide scope of these definitions.

The judgment carefully analyzed the reliefs available under the DV Act, including the right to reside in a shared household (Section 17), protection orders (Section 18), residence orders (Section 19), monetary reliefs (Section 20), custody orders (Section 21), and compensation orders (Section 22). The Court noted that these reliefs can be sought either through an application under Section 12 or in pending legal proceedings before a Civil Court, Family Court, or Criminal Court under Section 26.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER DV ACT

A crucial aspect of the Court’s analysis was determining the nature of proceedings under the DV Act. The Court referred to its earlier decisions, particularly Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Another, where it was held that “these proceedings are predominantly of civil nature.”

The Court quoted from the earlier judgment: “In fact, the very purpose of enacting the DV Act was to provide for a remedy which is an amalgamation of civil rights of the complainant i.e. aggrieved person. Intention was to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring within the family as the civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety.”

The Court also referred to Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, where it was observed that “the DV Act is a piece of civil code which is applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution.”

JURISDICTION OF COURTS UNDER DV ACT

The Court examined the jurisdictional aspects of the DV Act, noting that under Section 27, the Court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate has jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 12. The Court emphasized that “the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, has jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 as can be seen from the provisions of Sections 12 and 27 read with clause (i) of Section 2 of the DV Act, 2005.”

The Court also discussed Section 26, which enables other courts (Civil Courts, Family Courts, or Criminal Courts) to grant reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 in pending legal proceedings. However, the Court clarified that “Section 26 does not confer jurisdiction on Courts other than the Courts mentioned in Section 27 to entertain an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. It only enables the Courts mentioned therein to grant the reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 in the pending legal proceedings.”

KEY LEGAL QUESTION AND ANALYSIS

The central question before the Court was whether the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC or Section 528 of BNSS to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the DV Act. The Court noted that under the CrPC, Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates and Judicial Magistrates of First Class are Criminal Courts as provided in Section 6.

The Court analyzed Section 482 of CrPC, which states: “Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

The Court made a significant distinction between the two parts of Section 482. Regarding the first part, the Court held that “when a notice is issued on an application under Section 12(1), the learned Magistrate does not pass any order under the CrPC. When orders granting any of the reliefs under Sections 18 to 23 are passed, the orders of the learned Magistrate are not under the CrPC. Therefore, the first part of Section 482 cannot apply to proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005.”

However, regarding the second part, the Court held that “the second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, in a given case where a learned Magistrate is dealing with an application under Section 12(1), the High Court can exercise the power under the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Hence, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.”

SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE AND CAUTION

While recognizing the availability of jurisdiction under Section 482, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for extreme caution in exercising this power. The Court noted the fundamental difference between proceedings under the DV Act and criminal prosecutions: “Setting criminal law in motion has very serious consequences affecting the liberty of a human being, as the person against whom criminal law is set in motion can be arrested and sentenced to undergo imprisonment.”

In contrast, the Court observed that “if a complaint is entertained under Section 12(1), the erring respondent cannot be punished as is understood in criminal law. He can be subjected to various orders as provided in Sections 18 to 23. A respondent in the application can be prosecuted only if he commits a breach of a protection order or an interim protection order. Therefore, the consequences of entertaining an application under Section 12(1) are not as drastic as the consequences of setting criminal law in motion.”

The Court emphasized the welfare nature of the DV Act, stating that “the DV Act, 2005 is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence and for preventing acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law.”

The Court laid down important guidelines: “Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated.”

The Court also noted the availability of an alternative remedy: “We must also note here that against an order passed by a learned Magistrate, there is an appeal provided under Section 29 to the Court of Session. In contrast, generally, there is no remedy of appeal available against an order taking cognisance of an offence or an order issuing process. This is another reason why the High Court should exercise caution when exercising its inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, 2005.”

CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS

In its final conclusion, the Supreme Court held: “We hold that High Courts can exercise power under Section 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings emanating from the application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate. However, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application under Section 12(1). Normally, interference under Section 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice.”

The Court quashed the High Court’s order and restored the petitions, directing the High Court to hear them afresh in light of the principles laid down in the judgment. The Court also made a significant observation about judicial learning: “As judges, we are duty-bound to correct our mistakes in properly constituted proceedings. Even for Judges, the learning process always continues.”

This judgment represents a balanced approach, recognizing the availability of inherent jurisdiction while emphasizing the need for restraint in exercising this power, particularly in the context of welfare legislation like the Domestic Violence Act designed to protect vulnerable women from domestic abuse. The ruling provides much-needed clarity on the interplay between the Domestic Violence Act and the Criminal Procedure Code, establishing that while High Courts have the power to quash DV Act proceedings, this power should be exercised sparingly and only in cases of gross abuse of process or manifest injustice.

Petitioner Name: Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi.
Respondent Name: Vidhi Rawal.
Judgment By: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan.
Place Of Incident: Dewas, Madhya Pradesh.
Judgment Date: 19-05-2025.
Result: allowed.

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